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86-0029

9 JAN 1986

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Security

FROM: Richard J. Kerr  
Deputy Director for Administration

SUBJECT: Uniquely Sensitive Positions

REFERENCE: Memorandum for Multiple Addressees from D/OS,  
dated 16 December 1985, same subject

1. In accordance with the request of the reference, all Directorate of Administration offices, except for the Office of Security, have been polled on uniquely sensitive positions within the offices. I have attached the responses from these offices, except for the Office of Medical Services which had no such positions to report.

2. If you have any questions please contact [ ] Chief/DA Plans Staff, [ ] secure.

Richard J. Kerr

Attachment

ORIG: DDA/MS [ ]

## Distribution:

## Original - Addressees

- 1 - DDA Chrono w/o att
- 1 - DDA Subject w/att
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SEPARATED FROM ATTACHMENTS

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OC-0010-86  
3 January 1986

ATTACHMENT

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for Administration

FROM: [REDACTED]

Director of Communications

SUBJECT: Uniquely Sensitive Positions [REDACTED]

REFERENCE: DDA 85-3499/8, dated 23 December 1985, Same Subject

1. Following receipt of reference memorandum, members of my staff conducted a thorough review of all positions within the Office of Communications (OC) to determine what positions we could identify, if any, that met the criteria listed in paragraph 1 of the reference. In the final analysis, we believe that due to the unique status that communications personnel have within the Agency, which includes their daily access to sensitive and compartmented information passing through communications channels, few positions could be identified as "uniquely sensitive." The only exceptions to the foregoing would be those cases where an officer's planned involvement or exposure to a specific operation required additional security checks, including the administration of the polygraph examination. [REDACTED]

2. Regarding paragraph 1(b) of reference. Special scheduling for suitability screening, including polygraph, should be arranged when information comes to the attention of the Office or Agency that calls into question an employee's suitability for service. The information received should be validated prior to using it as justification for requiring the screening of the employee. [REDACTED]

3. Regarding paragraph 1(c) of reference. This Office is of the opinion that, during the first year of employment, most employees acquire considerable knowledge of the Organization plus some operationally sensitive information. Since many had never been exposed to classified information prior to their employment with the Agency, the manner in which they handle this information on

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
25X1 SUBJECT: Uniquely Sensitive Positions



and off the job may come into question. Additionally, most employees are recruited from outside the Washington area and their social contacts and lifestyles may not be the same as it was prior to their employment. We, therefore, believe that additional insights on each employee would be gained by further screening, including polygraph, after one year of Agency employment.

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3 JAN 1986

ADPP 1-86

MEMORANDUM FOR: Executive Officer to the DDA

FROM: Allen R. Elkins  
Director of Finance

SUBJECT: Uniquely Sensitive Positions

REFERENCE: Memorandum for Multiple Addressees from DDA,  
dated 23 December, Same Subject

1. Reference memorandum establishes the need to identify positions within the Agency which provide access to areas of information deemed so sensitive that individuals should pass a probationary period and polygraph prior to assignment. Following a conservative interpretation of the term "uniquely sensitive information", the Office of Finance can identify a wide range of finance positions that afford probationary employees access to what could be considered "high-risk information". Although all entry level positions within the Office of Finance provide employees with access to sensitive information, following are examples of positions which provide access to information that might be deemed sensitive enough to threaten national security or the life of an agent.

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2. In addition to the above, there are a variety of positions within the Office of Finance that provide access to information regarding contractual relationships, international agreements and methods of funding, the exposure of which could have an impact on national security.

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3. We applaud the effort to restrict access to truly sensitive information, and assume that the type of information indicated above does not fall within the narrow definition of "uniquely sensitive information". Exclusion of probationary employees from assignment to the above positions, although possibly beneficial from a security viewpoint, is inherently impossible for the Office of Finance. In most cases these positions are at the entry level; consequently, must be filled by new or relatively new employees. The information to which they have access, is restricted as far as possible; however, when made available it is absolutely vital to the performance of their duties.


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Allen R. Elkins

S E C R E T

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~~SECRET~~OIS 85-590  
30 December 1985MEMORANDUM FOR: Executive Officer to the DDA  
Directorate of AdministrationFROM:   
Director of Information Services

SUBJECT: Uniquely Sensitive Positions

REFERENCE: Your memo dated 23 December 1985, same subject

1. There are two areas within the MI career sub-group where employees occupy positions affording regular access to information whose unauthorized release could severely damage the security of our country. My initial instinct is to recommend that all the positions involved be classified as "uniquely sensitive" within the context of the referenced memorandum.

- a. One area encompasses virtually all the registry positions occupied by our careerists throughout the Agency. With the possible exception of certain DA components, registry personnel in the performance of their duties have access to the most highly sensitive information on a routine basis. This is especially so in the Executive Registry and in virtually all the registries in the DI and DS&T.
- b. The second area is the Agency Records Center whose employees handle all of the Agency's retired records, component vital records, and current back-up tapes for the Office of Information Technology. Some of the retired records such as the permanent records of the DO are quite sensitive and could cause considerable damage if released. Although most of the records sent to the Records Center are in boxes and are supposed to be kept there, a disgruntled or overly curious employees would have opportunity to open them.
- c. In both areas, the volume of sensitive material involved on a daily basis presents a serious potential for harm if any of the individuals engage in criminal activity, for whatever reasons.

All Portions SECRET

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2. Because most of the non-supervisory registry positions are at the GS-5 and GS-6 levels, they often must be filled by employees who have not completed their trial period and, indeed, are usually staffed with persons who have just entered on duty with the Agency. To delay the assignment of probationary employees even for a year would disrupt the flow of new personnel through the pipeline and would make extremely difficult our ability to fill continually occurring registry vacancies. There is no real alternative except to assign probationary employees to these positions even if it means we have to subject them to special suitability screening short of completing their three year trial period.

3. Special suitability screening for registry personnel and for Agency Records Center personnel would go a long way toward reducing the risk of exposing our most sensitive national intelligence information. A reasonable period of performance short of completing the trial period would be one year, subject always to the supervisor's determination that such screening should take place earlier if circumstances, including unusual employee behavior, should warrant. If screening involves the polygraph, it should be in lieu of a polygraph at the end of the trial period in order not to generate employee opposition.

4. I recognize that it may not be practical to designate all of the registry and records center positions as "uniquely sensitive." Perhaps the Director of Security, after he receives the Agency-wide response to his 16 December 1985 memorandum, will be able to provide a better definition of the positions to be so designated or additional guidance for us to make such designations. For that matter, we would also be prepared to accept the judgement of the component Director or Deputy Director in whose offices we have registries that their registries are or are not uniquely sensitive.

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OIT- 0002-86  
2 January 1986

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for Administration

25X1 FROM: William F. Donnelly [redacted]  
Director of Information Technology

SUBJECT: Uniquely Sensitive Positions in OIT

REFERENCE: Memorandum for Multiple Addressees from DDA,  
dated 23 December, Same Subject

In response to the questions in reference:

(a) There are several positions in OIT/General Operations Group, which contains the Communications Crisis Center, where sensitive traffic, including RH traffic, is handled, which meet the criteria stated in reference.

(b) In the past only communications officers with ten or more years of experience with the Agency were allowed to handle RH traffic. This was a built in security measure. Today, because of the grade structure, new junior personnel do get assigned to the Crisis Center, which is staffed 24 hours a day. Consideration should be given to special suitability screening for these individuals.

(c) Regardless of all the security briefings and other steps that are taken, I believe it takes two to three years to settle into the Agency's work/security ethic. Therefore, I prefer the screening to take place at three years. However, a short solution might be 18 months.

25X1 [redacted]  
25X1 William F. Donnelly [redacted]

25X1  
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3 January 1986

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for Administration

FROM: Henry P. Mahoney  
Director of Logistics

SUBJECT: Uniquely Sensitive Positions

REFERENCE: Memo fr D/OS to DDA, dtd 16 Dec. 1985,  
Same Subject

1. Listed below are the Office of Logistics comments keyed to the appropriate subparagraphs in the referent:

a. While there are a number of Logistics personnel assigned to uniquely sensitive programs throughout the Agency, none of these are under the cognizance or control of the central office; therefore, any determination of whether these individuals should pass a probationary period and polygraph beforehand is at the discretion of the host component. Within the Office of Logistics itself the only uniquely sensitive area identified is within the Covert Logistics Branch, which has some 12-14 individuals involved in sensitive operations.

b. Under normal circumstances, individuals assigned to the Covert Logistics Branch should have finished their probationary period. In those instances where such is not the case, special suitability assessments and polygraphing should take place as soon as possible.

c. Considering all factors, i.e., training, interim assignments, overseas TDYs, an overseas PCS assignment, the minimum probationary period for individuals in this office should be 18 months. In all instances where a PCS assignment to a sensitive program is to occur before the probationary period is completed, then special scheduling for suitability screening should be arranged.

2. An additional area of our concern is the Printing and Photography Division by virtue of the nature of the work being done and passing through the printing and photography plant.

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SUBJECT: Uniquely Sensitive Positions

Because of the large number of individuals involved and the severe impact any change in the screening process would place on the plant, it is not recommended that any of the proposals raised in the referent be applied here. While special screening would be feasible or appropriate, careful attention should be directed to this area to ensure that every security precaution is taken. NOT

25X1 3. Any questions concerning the above should be directed to  
25X1 Executive Officer for Logistics.

Attachment

Henry P. Mahoney

3 JAN 1986  
DPEAS 86-0003

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for Administration

FROM: Robert W. Magee  
Director of Personnel

SUBJECT: Uniquely Sensitive Positions

REFERENCE: A. Memo to Mltple Addressees from DDA dtd  
23 December 1985; Same Subject

B. Memo to Mltple Addressees from DDA dtd  
10 December 1985; Subject: Inspector General  
Report on the Edward L. Howard Case

To assist you in the formulation of a Directorate position on Recommendation C in the IG report on the Howard Case, the following comments are keyed to the three questions listed in paragraph 1, Reference A:

a. We have no positions in the Office of Personnel which we believe should be identified as "uniquely sensitive."

b. We are currently involved in developing in considerable detail a full response to the Howard Case. As requested in Reference B, this report will be forwarded to you by 15 January.

c. Again, our complete response will be incorporated into the report cited above. In general, however, we do not believe that anything short of 24 months would provide us additional insights to what was learned from an employee's EOD processing.

Robert W. Magee

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## ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

FROM: Harry E. Fitzwater  
Deputy Director for Administration  
7D24 Headquarters

EXTENSION

NO.

DATE

23 December 1985

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)

DATE

RECEIVED

FORWARDED

OFFICER'S INITIALS

COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across columns after each comment.)

1. Director of Training and  
Education  
936 Chamber of Commerce

2.

3.

4.

5.

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8.

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10.

11.

12.

13.

14.

15.

Phone - See deadline  
I don't think  
we have a  
position. Pls check  
with Wayne  
SL

Steve,  
Wayne and I think  
that the only positions  
which might be "uniquely  
sensitive" would be people  
involved with CAMS. I will  
write up a guide memo  
covering this and  
we will conform to COMDEX  
guidance on this.  
Jim

and Terrorism OGI

OTE 86-1000

3 January 1986

MEMORANDUM FOR: Executive Officer to the DDA

FROM:

Director of Training and Education

SUBJECT: Uniquely Sensitive Positions

REFERENCE: Memo to DA Office Directors dated 23 December, Same Subject

The Office of Training and Education (OTE) has reviewed positions within the Office which would classify as uniquely sensitive positions. Our reply follows three requirements per your Paragraph 1 (a - c):

- a. Identification of uniquely sensitive positions--OTE conducts training in support of two sensitive systems, CAMS and DESIST, in the Information Systems Training Division. The instructors and training assistants who conduct this training, as well as the individual(s) in the associated Data Access Center (DAC), fill what we consider uniquely sensitive positions according to your definition. There are approximately five instructors, two training assistants, and one DAC operator who would be affected.
- b. Scheduling for suitability screening--OTE would follow whatever guidance is provided by the two offices which are supported by this training for special clearances. Under most circumstances, the normal probationary period could accommodate these positions by assigning these individuals to other tasks until the three-year period has been achieved. Under some circumstances, such as lack of instructor availability, it would be beneficial to have the option of obtaining a special clearance after a one-and-a-half to two-year probationary period.

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**SUBJECT: Uniquely Sensitive Positions**

- c. Shortened probationary period--As noted in Paragraph b response, a period of one and a half to two years would probably be sufficient to obtain appropriate information regarding suitability factors, although the three-year period should remain the same standard under most circumstances.